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ABSTRACI' 
In this thesis I will examine the construction of the concept of 
Virtual Reality. I argue that rather than a technology of liberation as it is 
often perceived, virtual realities' conception has been influenced 
significantly by a discourse of control and order. I examine books, articles 
and films concerning Virtual Reality to support this claim. Furthermore 
this discourse of control and order is born out of a larger ideology of 
Western culture that values order and control. Throughout modernity this 
ideology has manifested itself through techniques and technologies of 
social and envirorunental control. I provide a brief historical outline 
highlighting some of these techniques and technologies focusing 
particularly upon surveillance. I suggest that under the gmding influence 
of the ideology of order and control one possible future use for Virtual 
Reality technology may be as a surveillance technology. The ideology of 
order and control is born out of a desire to transcend the unpredictable 
nature of life. 1hls desire is reflected in the VR proponents aim to create a 
totally known and controlled artificial envirorunent. I contend that an 
alternative way of thinking is needed so that objects such as Virtual 
Reality can be used for more appropriate purposes other than controlling 
and ordering. I draw upon the philosophy of Martin Heidegger to outline 
a thinking that is more open, and reflective, and that embraces the chaotic 
nature of existence. Such a thinking that is focused more upon the actual 
conditions of our everyday lives, may yield uses for technologies such as 
Virtual Reality that are more focused upon people's needs. 
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1NTRODUCI10N. 
Virtual Reality (or for short, VR) is a vague concept that has been 
defined in many different ways. Those in the field often have different 
conceptions of what it achtally is. Definitions capture certain elements, 
but leave out others. For example, Sherman & Judkins (1992, p. 17) 
associate Virtual Reality with immersion in an artificial environment: 
"Virtual Reality allows you to explore a computer generated world by 
actually being in it". By contrast Aukstakalnis & Blatner (1992, p. 7) 
associate VR more with the notion of interaction between a user and a 
computer: "Virtual Reality is a way for humans to visualize, manipulate, 
and interact with computers and extremely complex data ... Instead of 
using screens and keyboards, people can put displays over their eyes, 
gloves on their hands, and headphones on their ears". Immersion and 
interaction are just two aspects among several that make up the complete 
picture of Virtual Realiiy. Heim (1993, pp. 110-117) outlines simulation, 
artifidality, immersion, telepresence, interaction and networked communications 
as the six areas of Virtual Reality technology. Often these concepts overlap 
and a VR system may contain several of them at once. 
Simulation refers to the acting out of possible situations through the 
use of VR technology. The most obvio\\s example is a flight-simulator 
where the aim is to simulate the situation of flying an aeroplane without 
actually having to physically fly a real plane. The technology used in a 
flight simulator may be as simple as a visual screen, or may indude the 
construction of a complete cockpit- the intent is still the same. Closely 
linked to simulation is the idea of artificiality. The experience in the cockpit 
of the flight simulator may seem identical to the real thing, yet it is ,m 
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artificial experience without the same consequences as flying a real 
aeroplane. 
Immersion refers to the sensory experience of actually being within 
the virtual environment. The watching of a screen is a remote experience. 
The viewer is separate from what is occurring on the screen. VR reduces 
this boundruy by making you feel as if you are in a three dimensional 
environment. One way this phenomenon is created is by the use of three 
dimensional visual displays located directly over the eyes. 
Imtnersion is a form of telepresence. Literally telepresence means to 
be remotely present. It refers to the phenomenon where you are 
represented as being present within a virtual environment, whilst you are 
actually physically somewhere else. Your sensory immersion in the 
environment adds to this phenomenon of telepresence. 
Virtual Reality has several different forms of interaction. It has the 
interaction between you and the hardware. 'A'hen you move your hand 
within the data glove, you send a signal to the coltlputer. TI1ere is also the 
sense that you interact with the artificial environment. You remotely 
move around the environment and influence its composition. Another 
possible form of interaction is with other people in the artificial 
environment. Perhaps there are other people plugged into the same VR 
system as you, giving you the opportunity to interact with them. 
Tilis third type of interaction brings up the area of networked 
communications. Tilis is a phenomenon that is not directly related to Virtual 
Reality. · Networked communication is not a necessary aspect of the 
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experience of VR, such as the feeling of immersion. Rather it is a possible 
use that has been associated with Virtual Reality technology. Instead of 
communicating using the phone with only aural cues we could 
communicate in a virtual environment, conveying an experience that, with 
the continuing advancement of VR technology, could be tantamount to 
face to face communication. 
This is one of the chief goals that VR proponents espouse- a virtual 
agora. On this point I think there is some overlap between Virtual Reality 
and the Internet. Any networked communication needs a system that 
connects people together, and the Internet is the perfect tool for this. 
Rheingold espouses this ideal of a community connected to each other 
through the Internet in his book, The Virtual Community (1993). 
This notion of an on-line virtual world is captured in the word 
'cyberspace'. Coined by William Gibson in his novel Neuromancer (1986), 
the concept of cyberspace has been taken and appropriated as a utopian 
vision of the Virtual Community-as a "massive interactive cyber ftm 
park" (Dovey, 1996, p. xiv). Benedikt (1991, p. 122) defines cyberspace as 
"a globally networked, computer sustained, computer-accessed, and 
computer generated, multidimensional, artificial, or 'virtual' reality". It is 
this idea that I see as central to the hopes of the VR gurus. It is their 
ultimate dream to create an alternative reality that we can access from 
wherever we are in the world. It has not yet been achieved but is the goal 
that the prophets of cyberspace dre aiming for. Raymond Kurzweil (2000, 
p. 24) predicts that by 2020 "web-based, high resolution, three 
dimensional visual and audito;y virtual reality, and realistic all-
encompassing tactile environments will enable people to do virtually 
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anything with anybody regardless of physical proximity". 'lnternet2' is a 
research project involving 170 academics and 50 corporations that is 
currently trying to create the technology to enable these on-line virtual 
environments (Ditlea, 2000, p. 28). This conception of cyberspace has often 
been described as a liberatory project. As Robins and Webster (1999, p. 2) 
point out, "a distinctive technoculture emerged in the 1990's, fired with 
enthusiasm for what were perceived as the emancipatory possibilities of 
'cyberspace' and 'virtual reality'". This dream of a techno-utopian realm 
is the particular conception of Virtual Reality that I examine within this 
thesis. 
In the first chapter I look at the historical context in which the 
ideology of control and order was created and how this ideology paved 
the way for the conception of Virtual Reality. In the second chapter I 
examine how a discourse of Virtual Reality purporting to be about 
liberation in fact reflects the ideology of control and order. The third 
chapter explores some of the implications of Virtual Realities' alignment 
with the modern rational mindset. I show how technology under this 
ideology has been used as a tool of social control. I suggest that Virtual 
Reality might be used for similar purposes. The final chapter offers an 
alternative way of thinking that may provide a different conception of 
Virtual Reality and technology. This thinking may yield more open and 
positive uses for teclmologies like Virtual Reality that have not been 
widely discussed in the atmosphere created by the ideology of control and 
order. 
·,,·•, . 
THE HISTORY OF THE MODERN 
IDEOLOGY OF ORDER AND 
CONTROL 
In this chapter I will look at the ideology that gave rise to Virtual 
Reality. All technologies, including Virtual Reality, were not created in a 
social vacuum but are products of a set of social circumstances. The way 
teclmologies are used, and the discourses around them reflect the 
attitudes of that society. As Dickson (1974, p. 41) points out: 
we must look at the specific set of conditions that initially 
gave rise to these developments by retracing the history of 
technology. Some idea will begin to emerge of the incentives 
behind the process of technological innovation. These will 
indicate the type of social and political values implicit in the 
design of contemporary technology. 
To outline the complete history of technology is beyond the scope of this 
dissertation. I will instead provide a brief sketch of how Virtual Reality is 
a cultural artifact of modernity. More specifically I argue that Virtual 
Reality is based upon the valuing of rationalist control and the power to 
order things that is an essential element of modernity. 
Modernit)!:. 
It is almost impossible to define modernity as any one thing. For 
Berman (1983, p. 15) the phrase that most accurately describes modernity 
comes from Marx's Communist Manifesto: "All that is solid Melts into 
air". Berman is essentially drawing on Baudelaire's (cited in Foucault, 
1991, p 39) view of Modernity as, "the ephemeral, the fleeting, the 
5 
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contingent". It is remarkable how much these statements reflect the 
phenomenon of Virtual Reality, yet as practical definitions they fail to teU 
us what modernity is. 
Thompson (1995, p. 45) takes a more practical stance saying that, 
"Modern societies involved a distinctive set of economic changes through 
which European feudalism was graduaUy transformed into a new system 
of capitalist production and exchange". Although the capitalist economy is 
a crucial element of modern societies, modernity involved more than just 
an economic system. It included new attitudes towards science, art, 
politics and theology that are difficult to capture in a succinct definition. 
As HaU (1992, p. 6) contends, modernity "was the outcome, not of a single 
process, but of the condensation of a number of different processes and 
histories .. .it is these features which, taken together, provide us with a 
definition of 'modernity"'. I cannot list aU these features here, but we can 
now conceive modernity as: various modes of social organisation and 
attitudes that grew out of medieval Europe and became widespread 
throughout the Western world. 
Trying to locate when modernity began is just as difficult as trying 
to define it. Thompson (1995, p. 48) chooses the time when the printing 
press was invented as the symbolic beginning: "by 1450 a distinctive 
system of commodity production and exchange had emerged in Europe". 
Giddens (1991, p. 1) opts for the Seventeenth century, whilst Berman 
(1983, p. 16) prefers the sixteenth century. 
When Modernity began and how exactly to define it is peripheral 
to this project. The aim is to locate the ideology valuing control and order 
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as a part of the culture of modernity. I can then later reveal how Virtual 
Reality as an object of modernity has those same values of order and 
control inscribed into its development as a concept. 
"The Enlightenment. 
The valuing of control and order that is a part of modernity is 
crystallised in much Enlightenment thought. The Enlightenment is a 
movement that approximately occurred during the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries. Like modernity, trying to locate a beginning and an 
end to the Enlightenment is difficult. Outram (1995, p. 3) instead views 
the Enlightenment as a process: 
It is more helpful to think of the Enlightenment as a series of 
problems and debates, of 'flash-points', characteristic of the 
eighteenth century, or of 'pockets' where projects of 
intellectual expansion impacted upon and changed the 
nature of developments in society and government on a 
world wide basis. 
So what was the process that the Enlightenment centred around? 
According to Horkheimer and Adorno (1979 p. 3), "the program of the 
Enlightenment was the disenchantment of the world". There was a change 
from the dominance of religious and mythical explanations of the world to 
a scientific one. People such as Gahleo Galilei, Isaac Newton, Francis 
Bacon and Rene Descartes began to question long held beliefs. Gay (cited 
in Outram, 1995, p. 8) defines the program of the Enlightenment as one of, 
"hostility to religion and as a search for 'freedom' and 'progress' achieved 
by a critical use of reason to change man's relations with himself and 
society". Linked to this 'disenchantment of the world' were two key 
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words of Enlightenment thinking: reason and rationality. In Cassircr's 
words the Enlightenment was, "a value system rooted in rationality" 
(cited in Outram, 1995, p. 3). It was a body of thought that put faith in the 
power of the rational mind to discover the' true' nature of things. 
This type of thought is exemplified by Rene Descartes. At the 
beginniog of his First Meditation Descartes (1997, p. 134) sums up the 
project of the Enlighterunent by announcing: 
It is now some years since I detected how many were the 
false beliefs that I had from my earliest youth admitted as 
true, and how doubtful was everything I had since 
constructed on this basis; and from that time I was 
convinced that I must once and for all seriously undertake 
to rid myself of all opinions which I had formerly accepted, 
and commence to build anew from the foundation, if I 
wanted to establish any firm and permanent structure in 
the sciences. 
From there Descartes begins a process where he attempts to understand 
what he can be certain about and what he should doubt. He comes to the 
conclusion that the only thing he can be certain about is his own mind 
because "I am, I exist, is necessarily true each time that I pronounce it, or 
that I mentally conceive it" (Descartes, 1997, p. 140). Descartes elevates the 
conscious mind to the one absolute. A consequence of this is that there is a 
separation between subject and object. Due to the assertion that the mind 
is the only absolute there is no sense of interrelation between the human 
subject and the envirorunent. Everything separate from the mind becomes 
objectified, and can be manipulated and controlled. There is a distance 
between humans and their environment. This is evident in Descartes' 
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belief that animals are similar to machines, (1997, p. 107} and also in his 
view that, "the difference between a living and a dead body was 
analogous to that between a watch wound and unwound" (Turney 1998, 
p. 15). 
This, and other similar views of the Enlightenment, gave rise to a 
consciousness within western society that accepted the primacy of 
rationality in order to regulate the environment. This type of thought was 
essential in the creation of the social structures that came to be known as 
modernity. Society was no longer dominated by unchallenged sources of 
authority, such as the church. As the phrase, 'Disenchantment of the 
World' suggests, there was an emphasis on laying the world bare, so that 
it could be examined and controlled. Descartes' hopes reflected the 
emphasis on control in Enlightenment thinking: 
Instead of that speculative philosophy which is taught 
in the Schools, we may find a practical philosophy by 
means of which, knowing the force and the action of 
fire, water, air ... as distinctly as we know the different 
crafts of our artisans, we can in the same way employ 
them in all those uses to which they are adapted, and 
thus render ourselves the masters and possessors of 
nature (cited in Leiss, 1972, p. 81}. 
TIUnking along these lines became prominent during the Enlightenment 
and has influenced the trajectory of Western society. 
Horkheirner and Adorno develop a sustained critique of this perspective 
of the Enlightenment. They argue that the type of reasoning valued in the 
Eulightenment by those such as Descar',es is defined by "the creation of a 
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unified, scientific order" (1979, p. 81). Reason is "the organ of calculation, 
of planning ... its element is coordination" {Adorno & Horkheimer, 1979, p. 
88). They believe that thi; joining of thinking with order and control set 
western society along a path that ultimately led to the development of 
totalitarian regimes. They claim that "Enlightenment is totalitarian" (1979, 
p. 6). I argue that it is the values of the Enlightenment outlined here, and 
exemplified in Descartes' work that are now inscribed in the concept of 
Virtual Reality. 
Heide~er's Theory of 'Enframent' 
A primary way this consciousness of control manifested itself 
within western society was through the rise of modem science and 
technology. As Heidegger (1977, pp. 167-168) states: 
Science sets upon the real. It orders it into place to the end 
that at any given time the real will exhibit itself as an 
interacting network, i.e, in su.-veyable series of related 
causes. The real thus becomes surveyable and capable of 
being followed out in sequences. The real becomes secured 
in its abjectness. 
In many fields of science ordering and categorisation are paramount. The 
most recent example is the Human Genome Project which is currently 
outlining the genetic code of all human life. 
This striving to get everything under control results in what 
Heidegger calls the 'standing reserve'. Objects are only seen in terms of 
their use to serve an end. "Everywhere everything is ordered to stand by, 
to be immediately at hand, indeed to stand there just so that it may be on 
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call for a further ordering. We call it the standing reserve" (Heidegger, 
1977, p. 17). There are many examples of this within the hL•tory of 
modernity. The advent of mining on a large scale is perhaps the most 
obvious. Western societies plough the land for fossil fuels and uranium, 
so that they can be used for energy. Durkheim (cited in Beniger, 1986, p. 
219) states that, "the most vital trait of the spontaneous organisation of the 
industrial order is that its goal, and its exclusive goal, is to increase the 
control of man over things". 
One of the consequences of this is a narrow world view where 
objects are only seen as part of the standing reserve. Francis Bacon 
confidently claims that science, "takes off the mask <IDd veil from natural 
objects, which are commonly concealed and obscured under the variety of 
shapes and external appearance" (cited in Leiss, 1972, p. 139). Yet there is 
also the other side where sclence can be seen to cast a "veil of ideas" over 
the nature of everyday experience. (Husser! cited in Leiss, 1972, p. 139). 
Hill (1988, p. 39) expresses the opposing side: 
Through today's technologies we stand apart from the 
world, whilst our relationship to this world is mediated 
through an opaque 'black box' of technique. The relationship 
of people to this world is thus 'enframed' by what 
technology does, its use value in transforming the world for 
human advantage, and an aesthetic that views harmonious 
relationship and order as rational control. 
For Heidegger modem society's striving to control and master 
everything is at the heart of technology. He calls the process of ordering 
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everything for the standing reserve, 'Enframing'. ''We now name that 
challenging claim that gathers man thither to order the self revealing as 
standing reserve: "Gc-Stc/1" fEnframing]" (Heidegger, 1977, p. 19). 
Enframing is what drives modern science and technology. 
The ideology of control and order moy result in the objectification 
of the environment, but it also results in the objectification of people. With 
the separation between subject and object other people are seen as no 
different to the items that make up the natural world. 1hey are both 
separate from the personal ego, and are consequently seen as object. 
Humanity is part of the natural environment and is treated in the same 
manner. As Leiss (1972, pp. 15-16) argues: 
the attempt to master external nature has a close and 
perhaps inextricable relationship with the evolution of new 
means of exercising domination over men or, alternatively, 
human activity becomes so much a part of the natural 
environment that mastery of nature and mastery of man are 
only two aspects of the same process. 
Heidegger feared that man would become part of the standing 
reserve- a ccmmodity for use: 
As soon as what is unconcealed no longer concerns man 
even as object, but does so, rather exclusively as standing-
reserve, and man in the midst of objectlessness is nothing but 
the orderer of the standing-reserve, then he comes to the 
very brink of a precipitous fall; that is, he comes to the point 
where he himself will have to be taken as standing-reserve 
(1977 p. 27). 
13 
This is something that has afflicted modern 'man'. With the advent of 
industrial society, and then a more advanced form of capitalism, people 
have been used as a resource to be controlled and ordered. 
The Valuing of Order and Control: Industrial Society. 
Oppression existed before the advent of modernity within Europe, 
yet not with the same emphasis upon rationalisation and efficiency that 
was an integral part of the emerging modern consciousness. The process 
of industrialisation that began in England in the eighteenth century 
changed the Western world (Cameron, 1993, p 163). The industrial 
revolution marked a divergence where, 11 most production moved from the 
domestic unit to the factory, markets existed for just about everything, the 
scale of operations expanded, economic activity became increasingly 
internationalised, and products, services, and techniques that were totally 
unknown before came into existence" (Rider, 1995, p. 177). 
One of the major changes that occurred was the introduction of the 
factory. According to Heilbroner (1993, p. 78), "the Industrial Revolution 
was characterized by the rise of the factory to the center of social as well as 
economic life". One of the impetuses behind the creation of these factories 
was the increased ability of employers to control their employees. Rider 
{1995 pp. 197-198) sums up the situation: 
The factory concentrated workers in one place, aiding 
employer supervision. This contrasts with the domestic, 
putting out system, in wltich ... the worker controlled the 
pace at which work was accomplished. This limited the 
merchant-capitalist's complete control of production and his 
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profit making ability. 
Many of those em ploycd in the factories were women and children 
because: 
Employers believed them to be more efficient, most likely 
because they were more obedient, and thus a docile, more 
controllable labour force than men. 
In conjunction with the rise of the technological society, more 
sophisticated techniques of controlling people were created. In the third 
chapter I look at the techniques that have been used in more recent times. 
Mass Production. 
The establishment of the industrial society coupled with more 
advancements in science and technology were part of a complex process 
that cleared a path for the system of mass production that became so 
evident in the twentieth century. The ever increasing scale and 
complexity of industry around the tum of the twentieth century 
precipitated what Beniger {1986, p. 427) has called a "crisis of control". 
More advancements in technology and procedures were needed to bring 
the complete system of production under greater control. Order and 
control became esteemed values and were embedded further into Western 
consciousness. 
By the 1880s the concept of 'scientific management' had been 
introduced by Frederick Taylor and Frank Gilbreth. They tried to break 
the production process down into its simplest components, and create a 
standardized system in order to improve efficiency. They: 
studied all the different operations involved in production, 
selected the fastest way of accomplishing any given function 
(which involved eliminating any inefficient movements) and 
then recombined the operations into an efficient series. 'This 
series became the 'standard' method of performing a 
particular task (Rider, 1995, p. 423). 
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This type of organisation became widespread, and was epitomized by the 
Ford motor company which applied the processes of scientific 
management and mass production with great success at the beginning of 
the twentieth century ( See Rider, 1995, p. 329). One of the implications of 
scientific management was that workers were only seen as part'5 in the 
production machine. Taylor wrote: "In the past, the man has been first, in 
the future the system must be first" (Cited in Beniger, 1986, p. 294 ). 
This emphasis upon managing everything for efficiency resulted in 
what Beniger called a 'control revolution'. This is: 
a complex of rapid changes in the technological and 
economic arrangements by which information is collected, 
stored, processed, and communicated and through which 
fo=al or programmed decisions can effect societal control 
(Beniger, 1986, p. 427). 
This control revolution stems from the Industrial Revolution and 
continues, "unabated to this day" (Beniger, 1986, p. 427). 
Advanced Capitalism. 
The capitalist marketplace has progressively become more and 
more complex and has required greater rates of information processing. 
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This problem lead to the introduction of the computer: "Microprocessing 
and computing technology, contrary to fashionable opinion, do not 
represent a new force only recently unleashed on an unprepared society 
but merely the most recent in';tallment in the continuing c.k~vclopment of 
the Control Revolution" (Beniger, 1986, p. 435). 
The prime task that the computer performs is ordering. IBM, one 
of the largest computer companies in the world, was considering calling 
their first personal computers,' ordinateur', a French word: "God was the 
great ordinateur of the world; that is to say the one who made it orderly 
and according to plan" (Woolley, 1992, p. 74). This machine of order has 
now become one of the most pervasive and obvious symbols of western 
capitalist society today. The uses for computers are varied yet they are 
primarily used for organisation and categorisation. The computer's role as 
orderer is revealed in the term 'word processor'. Language is seen as 
something to be arranged. As Postman (1993, p 111) points out, "the 
computer redefines humans as 'information processors' and nature itself 
as information to be processed". The computer aids in reducing things to 
be part of the standing reserve. 
Virtual Reality. 
It was the computer's ability to render the world as data that 
ultimately led to the creation of Virtual Reality technology. In 1965 Ivan 
Sutherland published an article entitled 'The Ultimate Display'. In it he 
stated: 
We live in a physical worid whose properties we have come 
to know well through long familiarity ... We can predict where 
objects will fall, how well-known shapes look from other 
angles and how much force is required to push objects 
against friction. We lack corresponding familiarity with the 
forces on charged particles, forces in non-uniform fields, the 
effects of non-projective geometric transformations, and high-
inertia, low-friction motion. A display connected to a digital 
computer gives us a chance to gain familiarity with concepts 
not realizable in the physical world . It is a looking glass into 
a mathematical wonderland (Cited in Pimental & Teixeira, 
1993, p. 33). 
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Sutherland dreamed of a purely ahstract world of numbers, a purely 
scientific, manufactured world. In 1966 he developed the first piece of 
Virtual Reality technology: the head mounted display (HMO). This was 
essentially a visual screen that was attached to the head and located 
directly in front of the eyes so that nothing can be seen except what is on 
the screen. (Pimental and Teixeira, 1993, p. 35) Around the same time 
Myron Krueger was "experimenting with combining computers and video 
systems to create' artificial realities' (a term he coined) at the University of 
Wisconsin" (Pimental and Teixeira 1993 p 37). A growing interest in the 
possibilities offered by these initial projects combined with advancements 
in computing technology led to the consolidation of the concept of Virtual 
Reality. 
This outline of the modem ideology of order and control was provided 
to give a historical perspective in which to locate the construction of 
Virtual Reality. In the next chapter I examine how Virtual Reality 
continues the valuing of order and control that stems from the 
Enlightenment. 
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1HE DISCOURSES OF VIRTUAL REALITY. 
Tlte Research 011 Cyberspace is a quest for God. To be God. 
Paul Viri/io (1997, p. 44). 
The development of the ideology of modern technology is long 
and complex. In the previous chapter I have attempted a brief sketch of 
that procedure in order to show the milieu that enabled the concept of 
Virtual Reality to be developed. In this chapter I hope to show how the 
sphere of thought around the idea of Virtual Realit'j embraces the 
technological ideology of power and control. 
One of the most striking things about those involved in Virtual 
Reality is the way they perceive themselves and the technology of VR in 
religious terms. There are many instances where VR pundits refer to 
themselves as gods, or of the experience of VR being like that of a god. As 
the name of the book suggests, Glimpses of Heaven, Visions of Hell (1992), 
is one text that portrays this understanding of VR. It states: "so to a very 
large extent VR allows us (or at least the designers of the virtual worlds) to 
play God" (Sherman & Judkins, 1992, p. 127). Stewart Brand who coined 
the phrase, 'personal computer' has stated: "we are as Gods, and might as 
well get good at it" (cited in Kelly, 1994, p. 233). On another occasion 
when talking about VR Brand said, "junior deities, we want to be" (cited 
in Slouka, 1995, p. 71). 
Laurel (1991, p. 95) starts an article on VR by quoting Genesis from 
the Bible, "In the Beginning God created the heaven and earth". Myron 
Krueger uses the same comparison: 
The world described in Genesis, created by mysterious 
cosmic forces, was a volatile and dangerous place. 1t 
moulded human life through incomprehensible caprice. 
Natural beneficence tempered by natural disaster defined 
reality. For centuries, the goal of human effort was to tap 
nature's terrible power. Our success has been so complete, 
that a new world has emerged. Created by human ingenuity, 
itis an artificial reality (cited in Woolley, 1992, p. 7). 
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Benedikt goes a step further and compares cyberspace to Heaven: "The 
image of the Heavenly City, in fact, is ... a religious version of cyberspace" 
(Benedikt, 1991, pp. 14-16). 
Kevin Kelly's book Out of Control (1994) is a perfect example of 
the scientific attitude that extols the virtues of a near future where 
scientific and technological control of the world is pervasive. In a chapter 
called, 1God Games' he discusses conventional computer games and 
virtual environments. Like others he uses religious terminology. He calls 
Jeff Haas, a designer of' god games' a "Super God" (1994, p. 231). He goes 
on to describe his experience of a virtual world designed by Jaron Lanier 
one of the most well known VR gurus: 
At some point I hopped off the train near an inverted top 
hat. I stood and watched the train chug around the loop of 
track without me. I bent to grab the top hat and the instant I 
touched it, it turned into a white rabbit. I heard someone 
outside the world laugh, a heavenly chuckle. That was the 
god's little joke (Kelly, 1994, p. 240). 
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Like LaurPl and Krueger, at the close of the chapter he draws the 
analogy between the biblical creation story and the creation of virtual 
environments: "by now some of Yahweh's creatures have begun to gather 
minerals from the earth to build their own model creatures ... The 
simulacra they have built so far vary. Some species exist on another plane 
of being-virtualspace" (Kelly, 1994, pp. 256-7). 
Why is a modem technology described in such religious terms? I 
believe that this writing about becoming a god reflects the VR proponents' 
urge for power afl.d control. Those involved in VR research are drawing 
on their own cultural knowledge (Western Judea-Christian theology) to 
explain how they conceive this new technology. As Helmreich (cited in 
Noble, 1999, p. 171) points out, "scientists invoke normative notions of 
God and Judea-Christian cosmology when they speak about artificial 
worlds". Their identification with Christian doctrine, where "abhorrence 
of the body is inherent"(Penny, 1994, p. 235) and where God is an all 
powerful and controlling being accurately reflects their own desires for 
order and control. 
Noble argues that western society since medieval times has drawn 
on Christian religious myths to explain technology (1999). I believe that 
this religious element is part of the overall ideology of modem technology 
that enforces the values of ordering and controlling the human 
environment. It is part of the same ideology that instigated the Human 
Genome Project that is credited by Bill Clinton as revealing "the language 
in which God created life" (Cited in Alcorn, 2000, p. 10). Physicist Richard 
Seed when speaking about research into human DNA said, "We are going 
to become one with God. We are going to have almost as much 
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knowledge and almost as much power as God" (cited in Noble, 1999, p. 
vii). The Genome Project shares the same value system as the physicist's 
goal of a 'theory of everything' that according to Stephen Hawking will 
reveal 'the mind of God' (Cited in Wertheim, 1995, p. 13). 
One common way technologies of ordering and control are used 
most effectively is in the military. VR technology is no different as it is also 
being applied in the military: 
Video games in the wider culture are also about the mastery 
of anxiety and mobilization of omnipotence phantasies ... The 
parallel with weapons systems runs deep; after all, some 
innovators have alternated between designing military and 
entertainment versions of interactive simulation technology 
(Robins & Levidow, 1995, p. 109). 
One of the first commercial versions of VR technology, BattleTech, was 
based on simulators of military tanks (Pimental & Teixeira, 1993, p. 211). 
The reverse also occurred when the marines adopted the popular 
computer game Doom as a training tool Oordan, 1999, p. 189). The nuclear 
bomb is perhaps the most explicit symbol of military and technological 
power. Stenger (cited in Slouka, 1995, p. 30) unashamedly praises 
cyberspace as "the new bomb, a pacific blaze that will project the imprint 
of our disembodied selves on the walls of eternity". 
Underneath the religious rhetoric VR is about control. Yet it is a 
sense of control that goes further than that of many other technologies. 
Previous teclmologies have attempted to control the physical environment 
which is ultimately a futile project. The human race is a grain of sand 
within the universe. We will never control our complete destiny. VR 
22 
attempts to subvert this problem by creating an artificial universe that can 
be known in every minute computable detail. The goal of VR is flight from 
the chaotic nature of the physical environment: "all this is driven by a 
feverish belief in transcendence: a faith that, this time round, that a new 
technology will finally and truly deliver us from the limitations and 
frustrations of this imperfect world" (Robins, 1996, p. 2). Within this 
realm there are no surprises as everything is accounted for. As Heim puts 
it, "computerized reality synthesizes everything through calculation and 
nothing exists in the synthetic world that is not literally knowable" (Heim, 
1993, p. 105). 
The advocates of cyberspace seem to revel in this idea. Crandall 
and Levich (1998, p. 86) point out that "Virtual Reality involves a notion 
of special empowerment-the sense that somehow one can, via 
machinery, 'graduate' from reality to something better". jaron Lanier 
expounds this attitude: "In VR there's no question your reality is created 
by you. You made it ... I think being in that mode of realizing how active 
every moment in life is will break through the stupor" (cited in Crandall & 
Levich, 1998, p. 90). Benedikt, another well known champion of 
cyberspace, expresses the same sentiment when he states that we 'Will be 
able "to dwell empowered or enlightened on mythic planes" (1991, p. 6). 
This belief in transcendence is once again closely linked to the Judea-
Christian theology that has been drawn upon to make sense of 
technology. 
Those awaiting the dawn of this new artificial world seem to have 
an aversion to the uncertain, capricious nature of the actual world. Slouka 
(1995, p. 21) links their desire for a perfect world with their desire for 
control: 
Totalists uf all stripes, after all, have always been linked by 
their common desire to transform the world in their own 
intage. Totalitarian visions- whether utopian fantasies or 
dystopian nightmares-have shared an aversion to the 
world in all its quotidian messiness, as well as a 
corresponding preoccupation with cleanliness, order and 
control. All similarly, have been characterised by a vast 
arrogance, an unshakable belief in their own vision of a 
different world .... Theorists in virtual systems, if anything, 
went further, their disdain for the world was more 
complete ... they wanted the apocalypse. 
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Slouka dramatises the situation, but his linking of a desire for a new world 
with an urge for power and control I think is valid. 
Noble (1999, p. 207) argues that technologists often display, "a 
pathological dissatisfaction with, and deprecation of, the human 
condition". Hayles' (cited in Robbins, 1996, p. 5) comments support this 
claim as she shows an almost phobic distaste for the real world: 
In a world despoiled by overdevelopment, overpopulation, 
and time-release environmental poisons, it is comforting to 
think that physical forms can recover their pristine purity by 
being reconstituted as informational patterns in a 
multidimensional computer space. A cyberspace body, like a 
cyberspace landscape, is immune to blight and corruption. 
This attitude towards the physical world has its grounding in the 
Enlightenment thinking that I outlined in the first chapter. Descartes 
(cited in Noble, 1999, p. 144) also looked upon the physical negatively. He 
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believed that the human body reflected mankind's "epistemological 
falleness" and was ''opposed to reason". He too dreamed of a perfect 
realm, except Descartes' heaven was located in the areas of geometry and 
arithmetic, which were of "heavenly birth" because they, "alone deal with 
an object so pure and uncomplicated, that they need make no assumptions 
at all which experience renders uncertain" (Cited in Noble, 1999, p. 145). 
Popular Texts 
Much of this technological rhetoric has seeped into other more 
popular discourses. Recently several films have explored the subject of 
Virtual Reality and have also linked religion to VR. The film Lawnmower 
man (1992) is about a VR researcher, Larry Angelo, who uses VR 
technology for speeding up education and intelligence. Larry uses the 
technology on a young, simple man called Jobe. In Hebrew the name Jobe 
means "God is the Father" (Benjamin, 1983, p. 157).Witll the assistance of 
the technology Jobe learns at an amazing pace and he quickly takes on 
messianic airs. He decides to project himself permanently into the virtual 
world where he can be total master, where nothing will be hidden from 
him. Once in the realm he exclaims, "I am God here!" 
In the film eXistenZ (1999) the famous designer of Virtual Reality 
games Allegra Geller is described as the, "game-pod goddess." The trial 
run of her latest game, '' eXistenZ" occurs in a church, where the 
prospective players of the game worship and revere Allegra. One of the 
games she has designed is call 'ArtGod' because, "thou the player of the 
game art God." 
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In Wild Palms (1993) the company that makes the Virtual Reality 
technology doubles as a church: The Church of Synthiotics. lbe VR 
program they create is called "Church Windows" and the employees of 
this company/church regularly pause to pray together. Whilst in !ohnny 
Mnemonic (1995) good and evil spirits dwell within the virtual world. 
Yet far from embracing the claims of the 'virtualists' some of these 
films have portrayed a decidedly pessimistic future that diverges sharply 
from the techno-utopia that many of the VR gurus envisage. The world 
of eXistenZ is an unstable, frustrating nightmare where the real and the 
unreal are indistinguishable. Ted Pikul one of the characters in the film 
comments, 11I'm not sure here where we are is real at all!" 
As Jobe in Lawrunower Man becomes more obsessed with VR 
technology he turns into a maniacal tyrant who wants to take over the 
world, as does Tony Kroitzer, the master/owner of the Church of 
Synthiotics in Wild Palms. Kroitzer is revealed as a power obsessed, 
duplicitous ctiminal who tries to kill his own son. He tries to attain 
immortality by projecting himself into the VR world, but fails and dies. 
The film Brainscan (1994) along with Wild Palms and Lawrunower Man 
also links the quest for a virtual world with omnipotence fantasies. 
The Matrix (1999) aligns Virtuni Reality with control. The Matrix 
projects a dystopian future where l""Jple are controlled by computers and 
immersed in a virtual world called 'The Matrix'. According to Morpheous 
one of the characters, the Matrix is, "a computer generated dream-world 
built to keep us under control." The Matrix is one huge surveillance 
system, an artificial prison. 
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These films reflect common fears about technological change. Are 
any of these fears justified? Is there the possibility that one day we may be 
spending our time in a system not unlike 1he Matrix? This is a question I 
explore in the next chapter. 
Here I have shown how those involved in VR technology through 
their comments reveal that they share an urge for mastery. Their constant 
referral to themselves as Gods and their utopian dreams of a totally 
artificial world reflect their cravings for control. Horkheimer and Adorno 
claimed that the "Enlightenment was totalitarian" (1979, p. 6). Today we 
see the same values and totalitarian tendencies shown in the discourse 
concerning Virtual Reality. 
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A POSSIBLE DYSTOPIA. 
Whether it be the stump jump plough, or the nuclear bomb 
throughout history many technologies have been used as tools for control 
of the environment and for the exercise of power over humanity. Part of 
the reason for this is because these technologies have been located within 
the context of modernity, and have been part of the modem ideology of 
rational control and ordering. In the previous chapter I sketched how the 
discourse on Virtual Reality is influenced by the ideology of order and 
control. Yet we have not seen how this discourse will manifest itsell in the 
use of VR technology as Virtual Reality is yet to be implemented on any 
wide scale. When and exactly how (if at all) the dream of virtual 
cyberspace is realised is something impossible to predict. 
As mentioned in the introduction I am using my own particular 
conception of Virtual Reality. In this chapter I am using the notion of 
Virtual Reality as a computer simulated, three dimensional environment 
that people can access from differing geographical locations and where 
they can interact with each other. I make the assumption that such a 
system would require a central computer to generate and maintain the 
virtual environment. In this chapter I look at the increasing use of 
surveillance within modern society and argue that it is part of the overall 
ideology of order and control. The alignment of Virtual Reality with the 
same ideology, means that it too will reflect the values of order and 
control. As Fairclough (1992, p. 3) points out, "discourses do not just 
roflect or represent social entities and relations, they construct or 
constitute them". I argue that in the future there is the possibility that VR 
technology may continue the modern use of surveillance. 
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ln the previou& chapter we saw how those involved in the creation 
of Virtual Reality technology often conceive of themselves as Gods. 
Berkeley's Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge 
(1962) offers a conception of God that in several ways parallels the 
controller/creator of a virtual environment. Berkeley argued that because 
all we are aware of is our sensations, we can never verify the existence of a 
material reality. All we know of are sense data that our brain receives via 
our five senses. Therefore we cannot jump to the conclusion that there is a 
material reality beyond these senses, for all we have is sense data and 
nothing else (Berkeley, 1962, p. 69): 
Now, if it be certain that those original qualities 
(assumed, material reality) are inseparably united with the 
other sensible qualities, (sense data) and not, even in 
thought, capable of being abstracted from them, it plainly 
follows that they exist only in the mind. 
If nothing exists externally but only in the mind as Berkeley concludes 
then something must be creating these perceptions within the mind. He 
believed that these perceptions must be created by God. 
Berkeley's theory of our actual world corresponds with the world 
of Virtual Reality. In VR all we are aware of is our sense perceptions. 
These sense perceptions give the impression of an external world, yet in 
fact they are just illusions created in our mind by someone (not God but a 
computer programmer). Berkeley's God instead becomes a being that has 
created VR technology. Virilio draws the same comparison: "the 
technologies of virtual reality are attempting to make us see from beneath, 
from inside, from behind ... as if we were God" (Virilio, 1997, p. 44). The 
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comp.,rison of VR with Berkeley's treatise highlights the God-like position 
that the creator/controller of a virtual world may have. Yet it also displays 
the tremendous amount of power that they will wield. 
If we apply Foucault's work on power relations in Discipline and 
Punish (1977) we can see just how much power the controller of the VR 
environment may have. Foucault highlights the link between power and 
visibility in the modern age. He does this by using Jeremy Bentham's 
architectural design, the Panopticon as a "diagram of a mechanism of 
power reduced to its ideal form" (Foucault, 1977, p. 205). Foucault ( 1977, 
p. 200) explains the Panopticon: 
at the periphery, an annular building; at the centre, a 
tower; this tower is pierced with wide windows that open 
onto the inner side of the ring; the peripheric building is 
divided into cells, each of which extends the whole width 
of the building; they have two windows, one on the inside, 
corresponding to the windows of the tower; the other, on 
the outside, allows light to cross the cell from one end to 
the other. All that is needed, then, is to place a supervisor 
in a central tower and to shut up in each cell a madman, a 
patient, a condemned man, a worker or a schoolboy. 
What the Panopticon reveals is the strength that surveillance has as a form 
of control. All the inmates in the Panopticon can be looked at by a 
supervisor all the time. Nothing can get past the supervisor, so he has 
control, at a distance, over what the inmates do: 'The major 
effect of the Panopticon: to induce in the inmate a state of conscious and 
permanent visibility that assures the automatic functioning of power" 
(Foucault, 1977, p. 201). 
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It is important to note that Bentham designed the Panopticon in 
1787 at the peak of Enlightenment thought (Whitaker, 1999, p. 32). 
Accordingly the design accurately reflects many of the values and 
assumptions of the Enlightenment that I highlighted in the first chapter. 
There is the separation of prisoner into subject to be observed that 
accurately reflects Descartes' subject/object distinction. Yet primarily the 
Panopticon is a technology of control that makes the observer the, 'master 
and possessor' of human nature. As Lyon (1994, p. 62) observes about the 
Panopticon: "Enlightenment reason, concerned with empirical observation 
and classification, and related to the rational reproducing of social order, 
is neatly expressed". 
The thing that strikes me about the Panopticon is the similarity 
between the position of the supervisor within the Panopticon, and the 
controller of the VR environment. Like the supervisor in the Panopticon 
the VR controller has the ability to view everything that is occurring 
within their realm. Yet the VR controller's surveillance capabilities go far 
beyond those of the Panopticon, as the VR controller can manipulate 
what the people in the VR environment sense, as well as having the power 
to view everything they do. This is a tremendous position of power, that 
when associated with the discourse of mastery and control that VR 
pundits use does not auger well for any possible future where people 
spend a significant proportion of time in cyberspace. If the Panopticon is a 
mechanism of power, so too is the concept of the virtual environment. It 
is not hard to imagine the possible abuses of this power. Foucault (1977, p. 
203) highlights some abuses that the Panoptican may be used for that the 
VR environment may achieve even more efficiently: 
lt could be used as a machine to carry out experiments, to 
alter behaviour, to train or correct individual'>. To 
experiment with medicines and monitor their effects. To try 
out different punishments on prisoners, according to their 
ctimes and character, and to seek the most effective ones. To 
teach different techniques simultaneously to the workers, to 
decide which is the best. 
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These are extreme examples but it is important to recognise the power 
relations that may come with the advent of any widespread use of VR 
technology. Foucault calls the Panopticon a, "cruel, ingenious cage" 
(Foucault, 1977, p. 205). It is no coincidence that Mark Gibson, one of the 
first to envisage the application of VR technology, also described 
cyberspace as "an infinite cage" (Cited in Heim, 1993, p. 80). 
It is far from certain that any Virtoal Reality technology will be 
used for the oppressive purposes that the Panopdcon was designed to 
carry out. Yet within Modernity there is a long history of surveillance that 
is closely tied to the ideology of order and co,ttrol. Lyon believes that 
surveillance is a "vital aspect of the growth of modern societies; indeed, it 
helps to define such sO<.ieties" (Lyon, 1994, p, 41). Giddens takes the same 
position arguing that, "surveillance in the workplace is a primary featore 
of the emergence of industrial capitalism" (Giddens, 1985, p. 147). 
The style of production used during the Industrial revolution with 
its concentration of labour under the one roof created an environment 
more conducive to the surveillance of workers. Then with the rise of a 
more advanced form of capitalism there came improved forms of 
surveillance. As Whitaker (1999, p. 17) points out, "following the 
I 
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Industrial Revolution, the factory became a primary site for innovation in 
forms of surveillance and discipline." Dandeker highlight• that during the 
period from 1890 to 1930, the introduction of 'scientific' management 
resulted in a, ufar more detailed surveillance over the whole process of 
production" (Dandeker, 1990, p. 64). Henry Ford's 'Sociology 
Department' that sent out spies to pry into the private lives of his 
employees is a good example of this type of 'scientific management' 
(Whitaker, 1999, p. 38). 
In more recent times there have been new technologi~s that have 
increased the intensity of surveillance. The computer is the ultimate tool 
for compiling large amounts of information. It has often been used as a 
surveillance tool by gathering information on people. This gathering of 
information has been called 'dataveillance' because rathel" than 
monitoring the actual person as in conventional surveillance, 
dataveillance works by monitoring information about the person (Clarke, 
1994, pp. 122-123). Credit ratings are the most obvious example of 
dataveillance. Companies constantly gather information on how and 
when you use your credit cards, and whether you should be trusted. Yet 
there are loss obvious and more worrying examples. The Australian Law 
Enforcement Access Network (LEAN) contains all of Australia's corporate 
data and land ownership details which can be accessed by the 
departments of Social Security, Taxation and Federal Police at any time 
(Lyon, 1994, p. 40). 
This dataveillance also transcends national boundaries and is 
completely global in some cases. The UKUSA network is an alliance of the 
governments of America and England, with the inclusion of several 
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subsidiaf'J countries including Australia. The network was initially set up 
to monitor the telecommunications of the Soviets during the Cold War. 
Yet the alliance continues today and it has the ability to monitor nearly all 
the worlds' tele-communications (Whitaker, 1999, p. 92). 
Yet modem surveillance is not always in the form of large scale 
state run databases. It can also be focused on much smaller areas such as 
the workplace. A novel example is the 'Nannycam', a video camera 
m;uketed for parents to install surreptitiously in their homes to monitor 
how Nanny's look after their children (Whitaker, 1999, p. 80). In America 
up to a third of corporations also monitor their employees electronically, 
with techniques like e-mail spot checks (Whitaker, 1999, p. 105). There are 
other more complex systems of surveillance like the overview computer 
system at a timber mill documented by Zuboff. The overview system 
records information throughout the plant every five seconds. One of the 
managers of the plant said, "This computer is like X-ray vision." He then 
goes on: "its like lifting up the rock and letting the roaches scurry out. If 
the employee blows it, it's clear right away. You can know who didn't do 
what. If a person stops concentrating you know it from the data" (Zuboff, 
1988, pp. 316-317). 
This increase in the level of surveillance within our society has not 
stopped. As Lyon (1994, p. 204) states, there is a "constant quest" for new 
technologies that make surveillance more complete and more efficient. 
Thermal cameras now make it possible to view things in complete 
darkneso, whilst satellites can distinguish objects on the ground of less 
than a metre in diameter (Whitaker, 1999, p. 87). In America some 
prisoners are now sentenced to home detention, whilst being monitored 
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by electronic tags attached to their body (Mitchell, 1996, p. 77). There 
seems to be no stopping the degree to which surveillance technology can 
be applied as researchers in japan create 'cyberinsects'. They have 
attached microcomputer backpacks on cockroaches that send impulses to 
their legs so the cockroaches can be remotely guided. These cockroaches 
can then be attached to miniature surveillance cameras and microphones 
(Whitaker, 1999, p. 86). 
Bentham's efforts to maintain order through technology with his 
invention of the Panopticon is part of the same ideolcgy as the new forms 
of surveillance used today. As Lyon (1994, p, 77) puts it: 
Bentham, following the Cartesian logic that regarded human 
beings as machines whose activities could be measured and 
controlled, wrote impersonality, abstract classification, and 
automatic power into the Panopticon. Precisely these 
features reappear, now digitally inscribed and intensified, in 
the new, computer-run surveillance. 
People are now classified merely as part of an economic machine as good 
consumers of certain products or credit risks. Alternatively the state will 
see them only in terms of their probability to commit a crime. 
With the increasing use of dataveillance Poster fears the creation of 
a 'Superpanopticon' (cited in jordan, 1999 p. 201). Yet perhaps the 
Superpanopticon will only occur when and if virtual environments 
become places where people spend a significant amount of their time. As 
I have demonstrated, the goal of VR advocates is a totally known and 
controllable world. An advantage and perhaps one of the goals behind 
the urge to create a cyber-world is that such a world would be open to 
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complete surveillance. Bogard (1996, p. 37) believes that the essence of 
Virtual Reality is about surveillance: 
the promise of virtual reality- its imaginary- is in fact the 
pure surveillance machine ... This is surveillance taken, in 
imagination, to its highest level, to the very point of 
surpassing itself. [n virtual systems we are promised 
essentialized views of unlimited worlds, perfect control, all 
contingencies, variables, and paths accounted for, a perfect, 
delusional control-hypercontrol...A self contained, ultra-
observable, and graspable world. 
This creation of cyberspace as a surveillance machine is currently a 
long way from being realised. The important point is to appreciate that 
the phenomenon of surveillance that has existed since the Industrial 
Revolution is a reflection of the ordering mindset that has reigned 
throughout the modern period. This mindset has influenced the trajectory 
of science and technology within the Western world and has, as I have 
shown, manifested itself in a discourse of Virtual Reality. What is needed 
to resist the implementation of a superpanopticon, is an alteration of the 
ways we think. 
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AN ALTERNA11VE WAY Of THINKING. 
The predominant rationalist type of thinking used in the fields of 
science and technology needs to be tempered by the application of 
different philosophies. Virtual Reality has been used as an exam pie of 
how the ideology of control and order can affect the conception of a 
technology. Virtual Reality needs to be separated from this ideology 
through the use of different ways of thinking about technology and the 
world. This may result in a different practice and application of 
technology. 
In this chapter I will use the philosophy of Martin Heidegger as a 
guide towards developing a new way of thinking. Heidegger's philosophy 
is dense and complex, and it would be unwise for me to claim that what 
follows is a direct application of his philosophy. It is more a synthesis of 
some of his writings and my own ideas that developed from 
comprehending these writings. Heidegger's philosophy could be seen as 
the search for the meaning of Being. At the beginning of his major work 
Being and Time (1962, p. 1) Heidegger writes, "do we in our time have an 
answer to the question of what we really mean by the word 'being'? Not 
at all. So it is fitting that we should raise anew the question of the meaning of 
Being." Heidegger's philosophy is firmly focused upon our existence and 
the existence of entities within this world. 
There have been many criticisms of Heidegger's philosophy. 
Irigaray (1999) criticizes his work for being masculinist, however, the 
primary question concerning Martin Heidegger has been his Nazi 
affiliations (see Young 1997, Wolin, 1993, Rockmore, 1992). Wolin (1993, p. 
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2) argues that Heidegger's, 'alliance with Nazism, far from being a 
temporary mnrriage of convenience, was grandiose and profound". Yet 
others including Derrida (1989) and Lacoue-Labarthe (1990) have written 
extended defenses of Heidegger's work by claiming that much of his later 
philosophy is anti-national socialism. This is a huge debate that raises 
many questions beyond the scope of this thesis. Yet I think we should not 
fall prey to an ad hominem criticism but rather judge Heidegger's writing 
on its merits and not just condemn all of it because of his association with 
Nazism. 
Heidegger critiques the rationalist mindset born in the 
Enlightenment for its narrowness and its casting of a conceptual veil over 
the world. The scientific order may show us one way of looking at things 
but there are other valuable ways that have to a large extent been 
abandoned for a long time within the modern western world. Heidegger 
advocates a broader and more meditative type of thinking. It is this type 
of thinking that I will elaborate on and offer as an alternative to the 
rational/ calculative type of thinking. 
One of Heidegger's key criticisms is that "science does not think." 
(Heidegger, 1968, p. 8). This seems a strange statement but what 
Heidegger means is that science is a specialised area that can only deal 
with issues concerning its own field. Scientific thinking takes place 
within a conceptual framework and it cannot 'think' outside that area. 
Science and technology is successful at breaking things down into separate 
parts, putting those parts into a system and then being able to control 
those things. The physicist can successfully tell us how atoms interact 
with each other and the engineer can build a combustion engine. such 
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wonders of modem science arc important to us, but the scientist should 
not control our world view. Science tells us very little about morals, 
ethics, politics, art and many other areas of life. 
Scientific thinking always views things at the same level. Heidegger 
calls it "one track thinking " in a direct reference to the train trrtck, a 
product of modernity. (Heidegger, 1968, p. 26). This attitude tends to 
block out other ways of viewing things, ways that may be very, valuable 
to us, but that have been pushed aside by the dominance of the scientific 
explanation of our world. Heidegger (1968, p. 43) uses the exam pie of a 
tree: 
for we shall forfeit everything before we know it, once t1.1e 
sciences ... display the panoply of their documents and 
proofs, to explain to us that what we see and accept is 
properly not a tree but in reality a void, thinly sprinkled 
with electric charges here and there that race hither and yon 
at enormous speeds. 
The tree has been reduced to the mere stuff of the standing reserve, 
outlined in the first chapter. We have gained a great deal from using a 
scientific outlook, but we should not see it as the only way to view things. 
What is needed is a freeing from the constant categorisation and 
evaluation of things that occurs with scientific thinking. For in "marking 
something a 'value' we rob the thing evaluated of its dignity. This means: 
in esteeming something as a value, the evaluated is admitted only as an 
object for the estimation of man" (Heidegger cited in Harries, 1967, p. 182). 
The tree should not only be seen as a collection of a toms, nor as an asset of 
the timber company. The tree should be also seen on the merits of its 
appearance to us: 
When we think through what this is, that a tree in bloom 
presents itself to us so that we can come and stand face-to-
face with it, the thing that matters first and foremost, and 
finally, is not to drop the tree in bloom, but for once let it 
stand where it stands ... to this day, thought has never let the 
tree stand where it stands (Heidegger, 1968, p. 44). 
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In the first chapter I displayed the evidence of the 'one track 
thinking' that has dominated throughout modernity. What is needed is an 
alternative way of thinking that does not exhibit the same narrowness. A 
broader, less rigid way of thinking that will provide us with the ability to 
solve some of the problems of modernity in ways different to those 
offered by 'scientific thinking'. Heidegger's discussion of such a thinking 
is deliberate:y elusive because the introduction of any specific guidelines 
will result in the thought being ordered and controlled. Yet despite this 
limitation I think we can provide an idea of what this alternative thinking 
would be like. 
One of the key elements of this thinking is a sense of surrender. 
Instead of trying to dominate the environment, we need to sit back, stop 
acting, and reflect on what is before us. Within modernity there has been 
great change, and there continues to be great change. Scientists delve into 
areas like cloning without enough reflection on the implications of these 
massive alterations to our world: 
we do not yet have reflection when we have only 
consciousness. Reflection is more. It is calm, self-possessed 
surrender to that which is worthy of questioning ... 
Reflection is of a different essence from the making 
conscious and the knowing that belong to science 
(Heidegger, 1977, p. 180). 
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In conjunction with the notion of reflection there needs to be a 
sense of openness to what is being reflected upon: "It is necessary for 
thinking to become explicitly aware of the matter here called opening" 
(Heidegger, 1978, p. 385). What is this opening? Heidegger uses the 
metaphor of an opening in a forest. Within the forest it is difficult to grasp 
anything except what is in front of you. Yet the opening is a place where 
we can stand back and see things more clearly. (Heidegger, 1978, p. 384). 
Heidegger also quotes Goethe to explain it: "look for nothing behind 
phenomena: they themselves are what is to be learned" (Goethe in 
Heidegger, 1978, p. 385). If we let something exist as it appears, then we 
may gain a greater understanding of it. 
This openness carries with it a sense of broadness- a non-specific, 
wide ranging altitude towards things. Too often sciences' narrow fields of 
special knowledge fail to take into account the bigger social implications 
of what they are doing. As Barrett (1964, p. 4) points out: 
doctors and engineers tend to see things from the viewpoint 
of their own specialty, and usually show a very marked 
blind spot to whatever ,alJs outside this particular province. 
The more sharper a vision, the sharper its focus; but also the 
more nearly total the blind spot toward all things that lie on 
the periphery of this focus. 
This problem has been displayed throughout the history of technology, 
most notably by the scientist's urge to split the atom, despite its 
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destructive consequences. 
Lastly this alternative thinking needs to be less ego-<:entred and 
have mar~ of a holistic attitude towards humanity and the natural world. 
As mentioned in the first chapter one of Heidegger's chief criticisms of 
western thought is its separation of humanity into subject and the world 
into obje::t. This sepdration has caused western societies perception of the 
environment as the 'standing reserve.' What is needed is an adoption of 
the philosophy that humans and the world are intimately tied together; 
that they are two parts of the one thing. 
This is a belief that is part of many Native American and 
Indigenous Australian cultures. Many Native Americans groups believe 
that if you desecrate the land it will have repercussions for you: "the 
Iroquois consider, that there is a reciprvcal relationship between nature 
and man: if you take something from nature, you must give something 
else back" (Hultkrantz, 1981, p. 130). Chief Seattle expresses the same idea: 
"For whatever happens to the beasts soon happens to man. All things are 
connected" (Chief Seattle, 1994, p. 16). Anne Pattel-Gray (cited in 
Stockton, 1995, p. 81) explains a similar understanding within Indigenous 
Australian culture. 
In our view the earth is sacred. It is a living entity in which 
other living entities have origin and destiny ... We are bound 
to the earth in our spirit. By means of our involvement in the 
natural world we can ensure our well-being. 
This is a type of thinking that has in recent times gained currency among 
some groups, particularly many modem environmental groups. 
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This is one of the key points to Heidegger' s philosophy concerning 
science and technology. Heidegger (1968, p. 35) states that "since 
Copernicus, science no longer recognises sunrises and sunsets". What is 
meant by this is that modern man with all his knowledge has lost touch 
with his surroundings and in doing so has lost touch with himself. Barrett 
when explaining Heidegger' s philosophy expresses this view well: 
the businessman who flies to the country for a week-end, is 
whisked off to golf, tennis, sailing, entertains his guests 
successfully, all on a split-second schedule, and at the end of 
the week-end flies back to the city, but without once having 
had the occasion or the desire to lose himself walking down 
a country lane. Such a man, we say, is marvelously organised 
and really knows how to manage things. And, to be sure, he 
does show an admirable mastery over things; over beings 
but not Being, with which he never comes in contact. To lose 
oneself wallcing down a country lane is, literally, to lose the 
self that is split off from nature: to enter the region of Being 
where subject and object no longer confront each other in 
murderous division ... The man of today, technological man, 
is the final descendent of Cartesian man, but without 
Descartes' passion for clear and distinct ideas. As Descartes, 
locked up in his own luminous ego, confronted a world of 
material objects as thoroughly alien and perhaps 
unknowable, so technological man faces objects in his world 
with no need or capacity for intimacy with them beyond the 
knowledge of what button has to be pressed in order to 
control their working (Barret, 1964, p. 207). 
If we can regain this reflective, meditative thinking and reduce the divide 
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between humanity and the natural world, then perhaps we will also be in 
a better position to reduce the divisions between people. 
The rationalist mindset has not only imposed a separation between 
humans and their environmentr but as outlined in the first chapter it has 
instituted a division between people. Other people are al'io seen as object, 
and as part of the standing reserve. A less ego-<:entred attitude that can 
reduce the divide between subject and object, may result in more empathy 
for our fellow human beings. Rather than using science and technology for 
the exercise of power and control, it can be used as an aid for people in 
their everyday lives. I think we should focus upon human existence and 
use technology for the basic life needs of all people. 
The project of Virtual Reality has been to create an artificial 
environment that is tantamount to our actual physical world. The goal has 
been to transcend the world, to become a god. Such a project only 
manages to increase the separation between man and his environment. 
Within the virtual world everything becomes artifice, with no meaning or 
significance at all. As Cynthia Cockburn (cited in Noble, 1999, p. 208) 
points out this emphasis upon creating a new heavenly realm is 
misguided: 
transcendence is a wrong-headed concept. . .It means escape 
from the earth-bound and the repetitive, climbing above the 
everyday. It means putting men on the moon before feeding 
and housing the world's poor ... The revolutionary step 
would be to bring men down to earth. 
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There is almost a reluctance to accept the uncanny nature of our existence 
in the 'virtualist's' goals. As Robins and Webster (1999, p. 245) point out, 
"virtual culture is a culture of retreat from the world". It is a culture that is 
trying to circumvent the circumstancc~s of our existence. The discourse of 
Virtual Reality draws upon Christian mythology of a utopian, infinite 
realm because there is an urge to escape the harsh realities of our finite 
lives. This avoidance of our ultimate fate upon earth is something that 
Heidegger writes about. He believes that escapist notions are 'inauthentic' 
and we need to accept our situation: 
Being-towards-death, does not evade the fact that death is 
not to be outstripped; instead, anticipation frees itself for 
accepting this. When, by anticipation, one becomes free for 
ones own death, one is liberated from ones lostness in those 
possibilities which may accidentally thrust themselves upon 
one; and one is liberated in such a way that for the first time 
one can authentically understand and choose among the 
factical possibilities lying ahead of that possibility which is 
not be outstripped. Anticipation discloses to existence that 
its uttermost possibility lies in giving itself up, and thus it 
shatters all ones tenaciousness to whatever existence one has 
reached. (Heidegger, 1962, p. 308). 
This is a difficult quote, but what I understand Heidegger to be saying is 
that if we accept our bleak existence we are freed from 'those possibilities' 
like the 'virtualist's' delusion of a utopian realm so that we can focus upon 
our actual circumstances in life. 
The question has to be asked whether Virtual Reality is worth 
developing at all. There is no obvious use for the technology that is going 
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to aid humanity greatly. Talking about creating an artificial utopia for 
people to dwell in is ignoring the reality of many peoples' situation in the 
world. Poverty and starvation are evident throughout the world. Many 
people do not have access to sufficient food, let alone the technology 
needed to immerse themselves in a virtual environment. These are the 
issues that technologists should attend to first. Unfortunately the narrow 
technological ideology has tended to guide the application of science and 
technology into mastering and possessing nature, much more than aiding 
people in their basic needs. This is because of the separation between 
people that occurs with the modern rationalist mindset. Like Heidegger's 
example of the tree, people, are seen as a collection of atoms, rather than 
solely as people. Robert Macnamara, (cited in Dickson, 1974, p. 59) the 
former president of the World Bank displayed such a view when he said 
that the cost of raising a child in a third world country was six hundred 
dollars whilst the cost of avoiding its birth through birth control was 
merely six dollars. Perhaps with the application of the alternative way of 
thinking that I have sketched here, more appropriate uses of technology 
may occur. 
With a new thinking Virtual Reality may be use<! for more rdevant 
purposes. Virtual Reality may al•o help us to gain back a sense of oneness 
with the world. The current proponents of VR want to create a new 
world. Yet if we anchor the technology to representations relating to our 
actual physical world we may gain some benefits. The sense of immersion 
and the ability to manipulate the virtual environment mean that we can 
wear the virtual world like a garment. If this virtual world is related to the 
actual world then we may gain a greater sense of our interconnection with 
the actual world. Char Davies OSMOSE exhibit created in 1995 uses 
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Virtual Reality for just this purpose. The gallery description describes 
OSMOSE as "an art work that seeks to heal the rational Cartesian 
mind/body, subject/ object split which has shaped so many of our cultural 
values especially towards nature" (cited in 1-leim, 1998, p. 163). The 
OSMOSE environment consists of natural settings where the VR 
participant can merge with natural objects. A participant describes the 
experience: 
I am out of the dense forest and into a cozy clearing. Some 
leaves lie on the ground, a pond, a stream, and a huge oak 
tree generously giving its shade. I drink it in. I cruise around 
this area. I want to touch the tree but because I have no 
physical form, I cannot. I glide up through the tree and 
surround myself with their damp, exquisite beauty (Cited in 
Heim 1998, p. 164). 
Davies realises the importance of not trying to create a new world, but 
that VR should be used to complement the real world: 
OSMOSE is not a replacement for walking in the woods. It is 
rather a filtering of nature through an artist's vision using 
technology to distill or amplify certain interpretative aspects, 
so that those who enter it can see freshly, can become re-
sensitized, and can remember what it's like to feel wonder 
(Cited in Heim 1998, p. 166). 
Virtual Reality should also be used in a way that can help people in 
their everyday lives. The Virtual Environments Group at the Georgia 
Institute of Technology in the United States is applying Virtual Reality 
technology to help people overcome phobias. They use 'exposure therapy' 
which involves "exposing the patient to a virtual environment containing 
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tlw feared stimulus in place of taking the patient to a real environment" 
(no author, online, 2000). The use of an artificial situation lessens the 
impact for the patient of confronting the slim ulus, whilst still working 
them towards dealing with their fears. The group has used this type of 
therapy successfully with people who have a fear of heights, a fear of 
flying and people with post-traumatic stress disorder caused by the 
Vietnam war. Such a application of Virtual Reality technology shows a 
urge to help fellow humans that fits in well with the alternative attitude 
toward technology that I have outlined here. 
The advantage with Virtual Reality is that it is a technology that 
has not yet been fully realized. Therefore we have an opportunity to create 
something without having to alter and change what has occurred in the 
past. Virtual Reality is an opportunity. There are many ways into the 
future, perhaps the dream of Virtual Reality will never eventuate, it may 
remain the object of fiction. Yet as with all technologies, we must resist the 
discourse of control and order, and realise that there are alternative ways 
of thinking about technology and the world. 
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CONCLUSION. 
Within this thesis I have argued that a discourse of Virtual Reality 
centres upon the valuing of order and control. The primary way that this 
is achieved is through the proponents of VR drawing upon 
Judea/Christian religious mythology. They draw a parallel between their 
creation of a virtual world and God's creation of the actual world. The 
advocates of VR also compare their belief that the experience of Virtual 
Reality is empowering with the experience of being a god. They also use 
the Christian belief in transcendence by likening the creation of an 
artificial, controllable world to a heavenly, non-physical utopian realm. I 
contend that these comments of the VR experts reveal a desire for control 
and order. Their drawing upon the conception of God as an all powerful 
creator, and their urge to transcend their limited physical reality, to a 
totally controllable artificial reality demonstrate their implicit valuing of 
order and control. 
The reason that Virtual Reality is conceived in this way is because it 
is i.!>.lluenced by the larger valuing of control and order that is a part of 
modernity. This has been particnlarly pronounced in the fields of science 
and technology. Due to VR's conception and application largely occurring 
within the fields of science and technology, it has consequently been 
affected by their regard for order and control. 
Modernity is littered with examples of the ideology of order and 
control manifesting itself within society. The rise of surveillance 
techniques within modem society is a prime example. Technology has 
often been deployed to make surveillance more efficient. I suggest that 
49 
Virtual Reality technology as it is conceived within the ideology of order 
and control may be used as a surveillance technology. 
For Virtual Reality technology to be used for other purposes it must 
first of all be separated from the prevailing modern attitude that values 
order and control. To do this alternative ways of thinking about 
technology are needed . I offer the philosophy of Martin Heidegger as one 
such alternative. Heidegger was critical of scientific thinking for its 
narrowness, its marking of everything as a value to be ordered, and its 
inability to accommodate differing philosophies. He advocated a broader, 
more open style of thinking that did not see objects within a scientific 
framework but saw them on their merits. With the use of different 
attitudes towards technology, new uses may forwarded. In the last 
chapter I provided a couple of examples of uses for Virtual Reality. 
Instead of advocating a new heavenly realm to dwell in, these uses relate 
back to the actual world, and the real problems people face. 
LIST OF REFERENCES 
Adorno, T. & Horkheimer, M. (1979). Dialectic of Enlightenment. London: 
Verso. 
Alcorn, G. (2000, june 28). A first Step in the Realm of God. The Age, p. 10. 
Aukstakalnis, S. & Blatner, D. (1992). Silicon Mirage: 1he Art and Science 
of Virtual Reality. Berkeley, CA: Peachpit Press. 
Barrett, W. (1964).lrrational Man: A study in Existential Philosophy. 
London: Mercury. 
Benedikt, M (1991). Introduction. In Benedikt, M. (ed). Cyberspace: First 
Steps. Cambridge: MIT Press. 
Benedikt, M. (1991). Cyberspace: Some Proposals. In Benedikt, M. (ed). 
Cyberspace: First Steps. Cambridge: MIT Press. 
Benjamin, A. (1991). A Treasury of Baby Names. New York: Signet. 
Berkeley, G. (1%2). A Treatise concerning the Principles of Human 
Knowledge. La Salle: Open Court. 
Beniger, j. (1986). The Control Revolution: Technological Origins of the 
Information Society. Cambridge: Harvard Uni Press. 
Berman, M. (1983). All That is Solid Melts into Air: The Experience of 
Modernity. London: Verso. 
Bigelow, K. (Director) & Rauch, M. (Producer). (1993). Wild Palms. [film]. 
Distributor: Greengrass Productions, USA. 
Bogard, W. (1996). The Simulation of Surveillance: Hypercontrol in 
Telematic Societies. Cambridge: Cambridge Uni Press. 
Chief Seattle, (1994). This Precious Earth. Axiom: Australia. 
Cameron, R.E (1993). A Concise Economic History of the World: From 
Paleolithic Times to the Present. New York: Oxford Uni Press. 
Oarke, R. (1994). Dataveillance: Delivering 1984. In Green, L. & Guinery, 
R. (eds). Framing Technology. St Leonards, NSW: Allen & Unwin. 
Crandall, R & Levich, M. (1998). A Network Orange: Logic and 
Rewonsibility in the Computer Age. New York: Copernicus. 
Cronenberg, D. (Director) & Adams, B. (Producer). (1999). Existenz. [film]. 
50 
51 
Distributor: Miramax Films, USA. 
Dandeker, C. (1990). Surveillance, Power and Modernity: Bureaucracy and 
Discipline From 1700 To The Present Day. New York: StMartin's 
Press. 
Derrida, J. (1989). Of Spirit: Heidegger and the Question. Chicago: Uni of 
Chicago Press. 
Descartes, R. (1997). Descartes: Key Philosophical Writings. London: 
Wordsworth. 
Dickson, D. {1974). Alternative Technology and the Politics of Technical 
Change. London: Fontana. 
Ditlea, S. {2000). Meeting the Future. Technology Review, 103, 28-29. 
Dovey, J. (1996). Introduction. In Dovey, J. (ed). Fractal Dreams: New 
Media in Social Context. London: Lawrence and Wishart. 
Fairclough, N. (1992). Discourse and Social Change. Cambridge: Polity 
Press. 
Flynn, J. (Director) & Roy, M. (Producer). (1994). Brainscan. [film]. 
Distributor: Columbia TriStar, USA. 
Foucault, M. (1977). Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison. 
London: Penguin. 
Foucault, M. {1991). The Foucault Reader: An Introduction to Foucault's 
Thought. London: Penguin. 
Gibson, W. (1986). Neuromancer. London: Grafton. 
Giddens, A. (1985). The Nation-State and Violence: Volume Two of a 
Contemporru:y Critique of Historical Materialism. Cambridge: 
Polity Press. 
Giddens, A. {1991). The Consequences of Modernity. Cambridge: Polity 
Press. 
Hall, S. (1992). Introduction. In Hall, S. & Gieben, B. (eds). Formations of 
Modernity. Cambridge: Polity. 
Hampson, N. (1968). The Enlightenment: An evaluation of its 
assumptions, attitudes and values. London: Penguin. 
Harries, K. (1967). Martin Heidegger: The Search for Meaning. In 
Schrader, G.A. (ed). Existential Philosophers: Kierkegaard to 
Merleau-Ponty. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company. 
Heidegger, M. (1962). Being and Time. New York: Harper & Row. 
Heidegger, M. (1968). What is Called Thinking. New York: Harper 
Colophon Books. 
Heidegger, M. (1977). The Question Concerning Technology and Other 
Essays. New York: Harper & Row. 
Heidegger, M. (1978). Basic Writings: Heidegger. London: Routledge & 
Kegan Paul. 
Heilbroner, R.L. (1993). The Making of Economic Society. Englewood 
Cliff, NJ : Prentice Hall. 
52 
Heim, M. (1993). The Metaphysics of Virtual Reality. Oxford: Oxford Uni 
Press. 
Heim, M. (1998). Virtual Realism. Oxford: Oxford Uni Press. 
Hill, S. (1988). The Tra~:edy of Technology. London: Pluto Press. 
Hultkrantz, A (1981). Belief and Worship in Native North America. 
Syracuse Uni Press: New York 
Irigaray, L. (1999). The Forgetting of Air inMartinHeidegger. Austin, 
Texas: University of Texas Press. 
Jordan, T. (1999). Cyberpower: The Culture and Politics of Cyberspace and 
the Internet. London & New York: Routledge. 
Kelly, K. (1994). Out of Control: The New Biology of Machines, Social 
Systems, and the Economic World. Massachusetts: Perseus. 
Kurzweil, R. (2000). Merging Human and Machine. Computer Graphics 
World, 23, 23-26. 
Lacoue-Labarthe, P. (1990). Heidegger, Art and Politics. Oxford: 
Blackwell. 
Laurel, B. (1991). Virtual Reality Design: A Personal View. In Helsel, S.K. 
& Roth, J.P (eds). Virtual Reality: Theory, Practice, Promise. 
London: Meckler. 
Leiss, W. (1972). The Domination of Nature. New York: George Braziller. 
Leonard, B. (Director) & Everett, G. (Producer). (1992). The Lawnmower 
Man. [film]. Distributors: Filmayer Video, Spain. 
53 
Longo, R. (Director) & Carmody, D. (Producer). {1995). Johnny Mnemonic. 
[film]. Distributor: Village Roadshow, Australia. 
Lyon, D. (1994). The Electronic Eye: The Rise of Surveillance Society. 
Cambridge: Polity Press. 
Mitchell, W.j. (1996). City of Bits: Space, Place and the lnfobahn. 
Cambridge: Mff Press. 
Noble, D.F. (1999). The Religion of Tc'Chnology: The Divinity of Man and 
the Spirit of Invention. New York: Penguin. 
Outram, D. (1995). The Enlightenment. Cambridge: Cambridge Uni Press. 
Penny, S. {1994). Virtual Reality as the Completion of the Enlightenment 
Project. In Bender, G & Druckrey, T. (eds). Culture on the Brink, 
Ideologies of Technology. Seattle: Bay Press. 
Pimental, K. & Teixeira. (1993). Virtual Reality: Through the new Looking 
Glass. New York: Windcrest/McGraw Hill. 
Postman, N. (1993). Technopoly. New York: Vintage Books. 
Rheingold, H. (1993). The Virtual Community: Homesteading on the 
Electronic Frontier. Reading, Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley. 
Rider, C. (1995). An Introduction to Economic History. Cincinnati, CH: 
South Western Colley,e Publications. 
Robins, K. (1996). Cyberspace and the World We Live in. In Dovey, J. (ed). 
Fractal Dreams: New Media in Social Context. London: Lawrence 
and Wishart. 
Robins, K. & Levidow, L. (1995). Soldier, Cyborg, Citizen. In Brook, J & 
Boa!, I.A. (eds). Resisting the Virtual Life: The Culture and Politics 
of Information. San Francisco: City Lights. 
Robins, K. & Webster, F. (1999). Times of the Technoculture: From the 
Information Society to the Virtual Life. New York: Routledge. 
Rockmore, T. (1992). On Heidegger's Nazism and Philosophy. Berkeley 
and Los Angeles: Uni of California Press. 
Sherman, B. & Judkins, P. (1992). Glimpses of Heaven, Visions of Hell. 
London: Hodder & Stoughton. 
Slouka, M. (1995). War of the Worlds: Cyberspace and the High-Tech 
assault on Reality. New York: Basic Books. 
54 
Stockton, E. (1995). The Aboriginal Gift: Spirituality for a Nation. 
Alexandria, NSW: Millcnium Books. 
Thompson, J.B. (1995). The Media and Modernity: A Social Theory of the 
Media. Cambridge: Polity. 
Tumey, J. (1998). Frankenstein's Footsteps: Science, Genetics and Popular 
Culture. New Haven & London: Yale University Press. 
Virilio, P. (1997). Cyberwar, God and Television. In Kraker, A. & Kraker, 
M. (eds) (1997). Digital Delirium. New York: StMartin's Press. 
Virtual Environments Group, at the Georgia Institute of Technology. 
(2000). [online]. Available at: 
http:/ /www.cc.gatech.edu.gvujvirtual/ 
Wachowski, A & Wachowski, L (Directors) & Silver, J. (Producer). (1999). 
The Matrix. [film]. Distributor: Warner Bros, USA. 
Whitaker, R. (1999). The End of Privacy: How Total Surveillance Is 
Becoming A Reality .. New York: The New Press. 
Wertheim, M. (1995). Pythagoras' Trousers: God, Physics and the Gender 
Wars. New York: Times Books. 
Wolin, R. (1993). French Heidegger Wars. In Wolin, R. (ed). The Heidegger 
Controversy: A Critical Reader. Massachusetts: The MIT Pre·"· 
Woolley, B. (1992). Virtual Worlds: A journey in hype and hyperreality. 
Oxford, Blackwell. 
Young, J. (1997). Heidegger, Philosophy, Nazism. Cambridge: Cambridge 
Uni Press. 
Zuboff, S. (1988).ln The Age Of The Smart Machine. New York: Basic 
Books. 
